The rift between Fatah (secular, moderate, and dialogue with Israel) and Hamas (Islamist armed and at war with Israel) was once again highlighted on Monday, when most of the delegates traveled to Egypt. The president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas said that the death of Osama bin Laden was a fact "good for the cause of peace in the world." Gaza's prime minister and Hamas leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, accused the United States instead of "killing an Arab holy warrior" and its foreign policy based on "the shedding of Muslim blood."
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, insisted that he would never negotiate with a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas and yesterday, just as it signed the agreement, again called on Mahmoud Abbas to resign reconciliation. As a measure of pressure, Netanyahu refused to hand over to the Palestinian Authority some 80 million euros collected by Israel, by way of taxes and duties, within the occupied territories.
No Palestinian faction that Netanyahu had applauded the agreement and their reaction was taken for granted. The Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, Salam Fayad, said Israeli pressure not prevent reconciliation and that international pressure would eventually forcing Netanyahu to pay what he owed.
Also worried more. The very figure of Salam Fayyad, for example. West Bank Prime Minister, an economist and former official of the U.S. Federal Reserve has never had full legitimacy and the rift between Fatah and Hamas limited its sphere of influence to the West Bank while another prime minister, Ismail Haniya, was in charge of Gaza. But its successes in the fight against corruption, traditional scourge of Fatah, and good governance will become living proof that a future Palestinian state could be viable and efficient. The prospects for international recognition of Palestinian state from next September were based largely on the fact that Fayad was there. "We can not lose," said a senior Fatah representative.
Hamas, however, argued that they won the 2006 elections and they deserved the nomination of prime minister until new elections. To minimize the fights, the Cairo agreement stipulated that the interim government should be strictly technical, not political profile figures. Fayad was a technician, but his political profile was undeniable, as his popularity (with 56% approval, well ahead of Abbas himself and any leader of Hamas) and its prestige in the U.S. and the European Union.
Hamas, on the other hand, remained classified as a terrorist organization in the U.S. and the EU, funders of the Palestinian Authority, without which economic and diplomatic support the creation of a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza would hardly viable. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad both verbally guaranteed that after the agreement with Fatah would maintain a truce with Israel and disrupt the launching of rockets from Gaza. It was questionable whether this is considered sufficient in Washington and Brussels, as Hamas and its allies completely ruled out the possibility of recognizing Israel's right to exist.
In a way, the Palestinians were caught in a vicious circle. As long as the physical division between Fatah and Hamas, West Bank-Gaza was impossible to get a state, overcome, at least in appearance, division, new reasons emerged, diplomatic and financial, for which it was impossible to get a state.
Both Fatah, who had lost his tutor Hosni Mubarak, like Hamas, at risk of losing his tutor Bashar al-Assad, going through a period of weakness. Both parties were unpopular where ruled. Such difficulties could lead both to make concessions, but could also lead to a new rupture.